1. Hezbollah had earned quite a reputation after the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and the 2006 war. Mastering guerrilla warfare and urban combat, their strengths were tailored to fight an invading army on home turf—a role they were created for in 1982.
2. Post-Oct 8, Hezbollah tried to open a limited escalatory front with Israel to pressure it and divert attention from Gaza. This approach ignored their strengths and played into Israel’s hands, which excels in this type of conflict.
3. Israel, with its superior weaponry and world-class Air Force, quickly escalated the conflict. These strengths were ideal for the low-intensity war Hezbollah was fighting, but Hezbollah struggled to match Israel’s tit-for-tat retaliation
4. Hezbollah’s most powerful response was launching rockets/short range missiles, but Israel’s air defence network neutralized most of these attacks. This failure meant Hezbollah’s retaliation didn’t hurt Israel enough, allowing the Israeli Air Force to operate with impunity.
5. Ultimately, Hezbollah’s actions became a nuisance at best and ineffective at worst, while Israel’s strikes—especially on weapon storage and infrastructure—severely weakened Hezbollah’s arsenal and ability to respond in kind to Israeli operations.
6. Assassinations of key Hezbollah commanders further crippled their command & control, wreaking havoc on their operational capabilities. The escalation culminated in the devastating “Pager” strikes and a major decapitation strike, where Syed Hasan Nasrallah was martyred.
